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7 May 2009 marked the 
beginning of a new phase in the 
European Union’s relationship 
with its eastern neighbors. In an 
effort to strengthen the eastern 
dimension of the European 
Neighborhood Policy (ENP) the 
EU reached out to the six ex-
Soviet states of Armenia, 
Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, 
Moldova and Ukraine and 
launched a new initiative aimed 
at promoting a deeper political 
and economic engagement with 
these countries. One of the 
major premises of the EU’s 
Eastern Partnership (hereinafter 
EaP) is to build on existing 
instruments of co-operation with 
eastern European partner 
countries by introduction of a 
more structured mechanism for 
advancing the dialogue between 
the EU and its eastern 
neighboring countries. While it is 
high time for the EU to respond 
to the new realities existing on 
its eastern borders by reshaping 
and reinvigorating the policies 
pursued vis-à-vis these nations, 
successful implementation of 
EaP largely depends on the 
political will and commitment of 
the participating countries to the 
principles put forward by this 
initiative.  
By launching EaP the EU finds 
itself in a more comfortable 
position by establishing a new, 
and arguably, more effective 
channel for cooperation with its 
eastern partners, without exten-
ding the promise of the eventual 
EU membership. On the other 
hand, existing different con-
ditions and attitudes toward the 
EU integration within the 
countries in question represent 
major challenges for making this 
initiative work. As a result, EaP 
runs the risk of turning into yet 
another benign but ineffective 
endeavor if it does not take into 
account current realities within 
the EU as well as in its eastern 
neighborhood and develops 
adequate and necessary tools 
for strengthening the EU’s role 
in promotion of stability and 
security at its eastern borders. 
To this end, EaP should take 
into account the following 
realities: 
• Given that the six target 
nations have different policy 
priorities in their relationship 
with the EU, the latter needs 
to clearly define the modus 
operandi vis-à-vis each of 
these countries. This involves 
a realistic, case-by-case as-
sessment of each country’s 
ability to comply with the 
principles put forward by the 
initiative and employment of 
an adequate approach by the 
EU in its relations with the 
countries.      
• EaP does not address the 
problems of protracted regional 
conflicts; however, the EU has 
to strengthen its role in the 
conflict resolution efforts in the 
eastern neighborhood. August 
2008 war in Georgia 
demonstrated that this type of 
conflicts bear direct threats to 
the EU’s own security. 
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Abstract 
The European Union’s Eastern 
Partnership emerged in a changed 
environment where the EU faced the 
necessity to upgrade its relations 
with the neighbouring countries and 
channel its interactions with them in 
a more effective and responsive 
manner. Launching of this initiative 
demonstrates that notwithstanding 
the “enlargement fatigue” and the 
EU’s cautious stance toward raising 
any membership exectations among 
the aspiring nations, the EU 
considers it necessary to restructure 
its relationships with the neighbours 
in the way that brings them 
politically and economically closer.   
At the outset of this initiative one 
could argue that there is a long way 
to go for EaP to prove its viability 
and effectiveness. As it stands now, 
EaP presents an opportunity to beef 
up EU’s relations with the eastern 
partner countries, yet, without 
committing itself to a major strategic 
shift with an appropriate financial 
input. On other hand, the partner 
countries will have to demonstrate 
their willingness to pursue all 
needed reforms that will raise the 
level of their integration with the EU. 
Based on these constraints, the 
effectiveness of this initiative in 
promoting its overall goal of 
accelerated political association and 
further economic integration will 
depend upon the establishment of 
clear and realistic benchmarks per 
each country and adherence to the 
principle of conditionality on the 
part of EU. 
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Moreover, development of the 
sound political and economic 
interactions between the EU 
and its eastern partners is 
impossible in an environment 
prone to the outburst of 
violence and conflict. Thus, 
the efforts undertaken by 
means of EaP should 
eventually contribute to the 
stability and security in the 
eastern neighborhood.     
• EaP should not turn into a 
sole prism through which the 
EU sees its relationship with 
the partner countries. Given 
the fact that expectations 
toward the EU among the six 
countries vary, there should 
exist a certain degree of 
willingness on the part of EU 
to take the dialogue with the 
particular partner country to a 
higher level if the latter 
demonstrates a strong and 
steady record of adhering to 
the necessary political and 
economic reforms. By doing 
this, EU will provide a strong 
incentive to the interested 
countries to proceed on the 
path of further Euro-
peanization.    
The whole package of bilateral 
and multilateral tools is 
designed to bring Eastern 
partners closer to the EU. 
Besides providing new 
opportunities, EaP will test the 
ability and readiness of the 
partner countries to fully comply 
with the demands of the EU and 
promote further Europeanization 
in their countries.  
 
From ENP to EaP 
By development of the Euro-
pean Neighborhood Policy 
(ENP)1 the EU defined concrete 
                                               
                                               
1 First outlined in EC 
Communication on Wider Europe 
terms on which it proposed to 
cooperate with its neighbors, 
both at its southern and eastern 
borders, in the post-enlar-
gement period. By bringing the 
countries of Eastern Europe, 
South Caucasus, North Africa, 
the Middle East2 under a single 
ENP umbrella, the EU 
communicated two important 
messages: firstly, it established 
a clear separation of its policies 
toward south and eastern 
neighborhood from that of 
enlargement process. Secondly, 
the EU offered to upgrade 
existing cooperation frameworks 
to a privileged relationship, 
which would imply a deeper 
political and economic inte-
gration. The introduction of ENP 
was generally perceived as a 
positive step forward in terms of 
introducing a clearer focus and 
the country-tailored agendas for 
political and economic reforms. 
However, certain concerns were 
raised by EU membership 
aspiring countries and some 
experts alike about the wisdom 
of segregating ENP from the 
enlargement process. As the 
evidence suggests this has not 
diminished the desire of some 
eastern European ENP coun-
tries to seek regular EU 
membership3. 
While EaP follows the suit of 
ENP in not offering any 
                                               
in March 2003 and next thoroughly 
articulated in a Strategy Paper on 
the European Neighborhood Policy 
published in May 2004.    
2 ENP is not applied to Russia. Its 
relations with EU are governed 
through a separate Strategic 
Partnership covering four “common 
spaces” – on economy; freedom, 
security and justice; external 
security; research and education.   
3 H. WALLACE, The European 
Union and Its Neighborhood, 
ELIAMEP Thesis, 4/2009, May 
2009, p. 3. 
membership perspective to the 
partner countries, it reiterates 
that there will be no prejudice to 
individual partner countries’ 
aspirations for their future 
relationship with the EU and the 
principles of differentiation and 
conditionality still stand among 
the governing principles of this 
initiative4. This said, develop-
ment of EaP marked yet 
another shift in the EU’s policies 
toward its neighbors. EaP 
emerged as a response on the 
part of some EU member 
states, namely, Poland, Sweden 
and Czech Republic, to the 
initiation of a Union for 
Mediterranean endorsed by 
European Council in March 
2008. While the latter presented 
a new framework for strengthe-
ning the EU’s southern partner-
ships, EaP was envisaged to 
address existing disparities 
between the EU’s southern and 
eastern dimensions5 and develop 
the EU’s eastern policy based 
on upgraded contractual rela-
tionships. Some argue that EaP 
is another pragmatic response 
to “enlargement fatigue”, which 
allows for bringing eastern 
neighbors close to EU without 
alienating EU member states 
not prepared to discuss new 
enlargement commitments at 
this stage. In this context, EaP 
provides a chance for closer 
cooperation with the Eastern 
neighbors adding a “new 
quality” in their relations with the 
EU6.  
Georgian-Russian war in August 
2008 gave an impetus to the 
4 Joint Declaration of the Prague 
Eastern Partnership Summit, ì May 
7, 2009, www.eu2009.cz. 
5 Eastern Partnership: The 
Opening Report, The Polish 
Institute of International Affairs, 
April 2009, www.pism.pl. 
6 Ibidem.  
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process of developing this new 
regional cooperation proposal. 
Besides the clear repercussions 
that this conflict had on stability 
and security in Europe, it 
demonstrated to the EU that it 
needs to develop an un-
ambiguous policy toward its 
eastern neighborhood which 
would take into account existing 
political realities and serve as a 
tool for securing the EU’s 
interests as well. In this light, 
EaP provides an opportunity to 
increase the EU’s role in the 
region through strengthening 
bilateral and multilateral inter-
actions with the partner 
countries on the matters of 
common interest.  
This emphasis on common 
interests and commitments is 
made in the very first paragraph 
of the Joint Declaration of the 
Prague Summit of 7 May 2009. 
Unsurprisingly, the reference to 
the values that EU stands for 
comes next. This is explained 
by the limitations that the 
existing conditions in partner 
countries set on EU’s ap-
plication of its core standards of 
freedom and good governance. 
Moreover, since the summit 
declarations bear no binding 
force, some argue that this will 
hardly guarantee commitment of 
the partner countries. Ahead of 
the Prague Summit certain 
skepticism was aired on the 
Joint Declaration being an 
ambitious articulation of ideas, 
rather than a summary of 
conditions that make closer 
cooperation unavoidable7.  
Certainly, EU member states 
have been very careful in 
choosing the wording for 
                                               
7 A. LOBJAKAS, EU's Eastern 
Partnership Strains To Juggle 
Interests, Values, RFE/RL, April 
29, 2009, www.rferl.org.  
announcing this initiative. To 
begin with, the draft text of the 
Joint Declaration was amended 
to change the definition of six 
partner countries from 
“European” to “Eastern Euro-
pean” to prevent encou-
ragement for EU membership 
and appease concerns of some 
western European EU mem-
bers. Besides the softened 
language on advancement of 
European values, the summit 
document is particularly cautious 
with regard to the issue of visa 
liberalization. Respective clause 
articulates the EU support for 
mobility of citizens and pledges 
“to take gradual steps towards 
full visa liberalization as a long 
term goal for individual partner 
countries on a case-by-case 
basis provided that conditions 
for well-managed and secure 
mobility are in place”8. This 
modest articulation comes as a 
toned-down version of the 
wording that the proponents of 
this initiative put forward in their 
original proposals, namely the 
one put forward by Poland on 
introduction of visa facilitations 
for eastern neighbors with the 
abolition of visas envisaged in 
the long run9 and Czech 
proposals which spoke of “visa 
free” travel10. 
 
What’s New in EaP? 
In addition to the existing 
bilateral cooperation mecha-
nisms between the EU and 
                                               
8 Joint Declaration of the Prague 
Eastern Partnership Summit, May 
7, 2009, www.eu2009.cz. 
9 Eastern Partnership: The 
Opening Report, The Polish 
Institute of International Affairs, 
April 2009, www.pism.pl.  
10 A. RETTMAN, EU Summit Text 
loaded With Eastern Tension, 
EUObserver.com, May 7, 2009. 
partner countries, which 
constitute a central element of 
ENP, EaP offers a multilateral 
track in its relations with the 
eastern neighbors. This 
multilateral component will 
function as a forum for 
exchange of experiences and 
development of joint activities. In 
terms of operational structure, it 
will involve: (a) meetings of  
Heads of State or Government 
of the EaP every two years; (b) 
annual meetings of the Ministers 
of Foreign Affairs; and (c) 
establishment of four thematic 
platforms which will convene at 
least twice a year with 
participation of senior officials 
from respective policy areas. 
The four themes are developed 
in accordance to the main areas 
of cooperation: 1. Democracy, 
good governance and stability; 
2. Economic integration and 
convergence with the EU 
policies; 3. Energy security; 4. 
Contacts between people. In 
addition, supporting panels for 
the thematic platforms are to be 
established in specific areas 
with the format and participants 
to be determined according to 
the need11. In an effort to 
showcase and augment this 
multilateral component Euro-
pean Commission promotes five 
flagship initiatives on Integrated 
Border Management Pro-
gramme; SME facility; regional 
electricity markets, improved 
energy efficiency and increased 
use of renewable energy 
sources; southern energy 
corridor; and response to 
disasters.  
                                               
11 EC Communication on Eastern 
Partnership. Brussels, December 
3, 2008, http://ec.europa.eu/extern 
al_relations/eastern/index_en.htm. 
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Another new element is the offer 
of a new contractual basis12 – 
Association Agreements (AAs) 
between EU and partner 
countries «who are willing and 
able to comply with the resulting 
commitments»13. As a mani 
festation of a deeper bilateral 
engagement with the eastern 
partners, the EU extends new 
AAs which will provide the legal 
basis for a higher degree of 
political and economic enga 
gement with the eastern 
partners.   
While the detailed analysis of 
the new bilateral and multilateral 
frameworks that EaP offers 
goes beyond the scope of this 
paper, there are several key 
elements that should be 
emphasized. First of all, EaP 
paves the way for establishment 
of deep and comprehensive free 
trade areas (DCFTAs) with each 
partner country’s WTO mem-
bership being a necessary 
prerequisite. DCFTAs will 
contain legally binding commit-
ments on regulatory 
approximation in trade-related 
areas and will anchor the 
necessary economic moder-
nization within the partner 
countries14.   
The EU will adopt a gradual and 
case-by-case approach in 
dealing with the visa facilitation 
issue and will link this process to 
the existence of conditions for 
well-managed and secure 
mobility within the partner 
countries. Based on the 
“mobility and security pacts”, 
specific roadmaps will be 
                                               
12 ENP builds on existing 
Partnership and Cooperation 
Agreements (PCAs) 
13 Ibidem. 
14 EC Communication on Eastern 
Partnership. Brussels, December 
3, 2008, http://ec.europa.eu/extern 
al_relations/eastern/index_en.htm. 
developed in relation with the 
partner countries which will 
entail progressive visa policies 
subject to the compliance of the 
partner country to the 
obligations of respective agree-
ments.   
As means of strengthening 
capacities of the eastern 
partners in implementation of 
political and economic reforms 
the EU will develop Com-
prehensive Institution-Building 
Programmes (CIBs) to improve 
administrative capacities of 
individual countries through 
trainings and technical as-
sistance. This element is of a 
particular importance in terms of 
reinforcing the potential impact 
of the EU support. By investing 
in strengthening local capacities 
for negotiating and imple-
menting EaP commitments, the 
EU will maximize the re-
ceptiveness of reforms in the 
partner countries, thus con-
tributing to the sustainability of 
these reforms.  
In parallel to the multilateral 
framework for cooperation in the 
area of energy security, EaP will 
employ bilateral measures 
ranging from inclusion of 
“Energy interdependence” pro-
visions in the AAs to gradual 
convergence with the EU 
energy markets and infra-
structure integration.   
All these elements build into the 
common policy that EU pledges 
to promote vis-à-vis its eastern 
neighbors. Clearly, much 
depends on the existence of the 
necessary political will within EU 
member states as well as 
eastern partners which will allow 
for turning this ambitious 
agenda into a reality. The 
emphasis on joint ownership 
threads all documents on EaP 
and this is something that the 
EU and partner countries will 
need to nurture.      
 
Challenges ahead  
There are certain problems 
which might turn into spoilers if 
not addressed and accom-
modated throughout the 
process of EaP implementation. 
These problems are of 
geopolitical as well as functional 
nature. As expected, the most 
conspicuous one refers to 
relationship with Russia in the 
context of this new EU 
undertaking. Russia’s reaction 
came in the words of criticism 
from the country’s foreign 
minister Sergei Lavrov who 
suggested that EU was seeking 
to build its sphere of influence 
into the former Soviet territory. 
In addition, Lavrov demanded 
the right for Russia to have a 
say on international questions 
affecting Russia15. In a 
response to this allegation EU 
High Representative for CFSP 
Javier Solana noted that by 
means of this effort EU wants to 
«establish a mechanism of 
relationship which is more 
stable, more institutional, and 
that has nothing to do with our 
[EU’s] relationship with Rus-
sia»16.  
Opinions in Russia consider this 
initiative largely in the 
geopolitical terms and regard it 
as an effort against the 
geopolitical interests of Russia. 
The major argument suggests 
that by reaching out to the 
countries constituting sphere of 
“Russia’s privileged interests” 
                                               
15 Moscow Worried over Eastern 
Partnership, May 6, 2009, 
www.earthtimes.org. 
16 EU Hits Back at Russian 
“Nonsense” over Eastern Initiative, 
Source: silverscorpio.com. 
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the EU seeks to weaken Russia 
and cause an ultimate sepa-
ration of former Soviet states 
from Russia17.    
In an effort to somehow 
accommodate Russia’s con-
cerns the EU has included 
provision on development of 
bilateral cooperation with the 
third states (namely, Russia and 
Turkey) which will go in parallel 
with EaP. In addition, EC 
Communication on EaP offers a 
possibility to cooperate with the 
third countries within the 
multilateral framework and 
reads as follows: “third countries 
could be involved in the work of 
a thematic platform, a panel or 
an initiative, on a case by case 
basis and if there is agreement 
that common interests in a topic, 
geographical proximity or 
existing economic links would 
make this beneficial”18. This, 
however, is expected to be 
hardly sufficient to change 
Russia’s mindset on the matter.   
In the context of this geopolitical 
dilemma, the EU will inevitably 
face the problem of accom-
modating certain contradictions 
in the partner countries’ 
commitments as well. This is 
most salient in the case of 
Belarus. Despite strong 
reservations voiced within the 
EU toward extending EaP to 
this country, ruled by an 
authoritarian regime of 
Alyeksandr Lukashenka, the EU 
eventually decided to abandon 
its policy of isolation in favor of 
the policy of engagement. 
Besides running the risk of 
                                               
17 Сергей Жильцов, СНГ под 
натиском "Восточного парт-
нерства, in «Независимая Га-
зета», April 30, 2009, www.ng.ru. 
18 EC Communication on Eastern 
Partnership. Brussels, December 
3, 2008, http://ec.europa.eu/exter n 
al_relations/eastern/index_en.htm. 
legitimizing Lukashenka regime, 
EU also opens the door to 
serious legal questions over 
where the jurisdiction of 
Eurasian Economic Community 
(EuroAsEc) ends, with Belarus 
being a member country19, and 
that of EaP begins20. In case of 
Belarus, however, further 
skepticism is invited by the 
unfavorable political conditions 
within the country which may 
render EU’s principle of 
conditionality unworkable in this 
particular case.   
Generally, EaP will have to deal 
with a very diverse group of 
partners and this factor 
particularly complicates enga-
gement of all partners in the 
multilateral framework of 
cooperation as envisaged by 
EaP. Different values, political 
agendas and alliances that drive 
the policies of the six EaP 
countries present a challenge to 
their compliance to the EU 
acquis.  
Significance of EaP for the 
countries of South Caucasus 
largely relies on the hopes for a 
larger degree of EU involvement 
in the region that will reinforce 
stability and bring positive effect 
to stalled processes of conflict 
resolution. Security considera-
tions are at the core of the 
approaches undertaken by 
these countries in their relations 
with EU. While all of them have 
declared EU integration as their 
“strategic choice” (with the 
different degree of practical 
evidence to support these 
declarations), there is no 
                                               
19 Established in 2000, EurAsEc 
created a single economic space 
and free trade zone among its 
members.   
20 Belarus and the Dilemmas of the 
Eastern Partnership, in «Eurasia 
Daily Monitor», 6, 82, April 29, 
2009.  
coherence within the group due 
to the existing security problems 
and, hence, different per-
ceptions on ensuring one’s 
security. For instance, for 
Georgia Russian policies 
constitute a major security 
threat, while Armenia regards 
Russia as a guarantor of its 
security and heavily relies on it 
not only militarily, but also 
politically and economically.    
All three countries of South 
Caucasus praise the possibility 
of creating free trade zones and 
visa liberalization that EaP 
offers. It is yet to be seen what 
will be their record of com-
pliance to the conditions and 
requirement put in place by EU 
in return to these rewards.   
Georgia regards EaP as 
another avenue to intensify its 
interactions with the EU. How-
ever, it should be mentioned 
that there is a limited debate on 
the issue within Georgian 
society at large. Generally, this 
initiative is perceived as a 
contributor to increasing the 
EU’s role in the region and an 
opportunity for Georgia to draw 
the EU’s attention to the most 
salient problems Georgia faces 
in the aftermath of the August 
2008 war. In addition to the 
traditional set of expectations – 
visa facilitation, establishment of 
free trade area – Georgia hopes 
that the EU will significantly 
contribute to the economic 
reconstruction of the country. As 
regards to the direct benefits 
this initiative offers in terms of 
consolidating and fostering 
democratic and  economic re-
forms, Georgia considers EaP 
as a valuable tool for advancing 
on its path to the EU integration 
and by no means as a 
substitute to the EU 
membership perspective. The 
most immediate concern that 
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comes into view at this stage 
refers to Georgia’s inability to 
comply with EaP on the policies 
reflecting EU’s regulatory 
approach. As an expert on 
Georgia-EU relations Kakha 
Gogolashvili suggests “The 
government’s ultraliberal econo-
mic policy, taking “deregulation” 
as a founding principle, has 
conflicted with ENP Action Plan 
commitments. There is still a 
lack of understanding of the 
importance of compliance with 
all topics of the Action Plan, if 
real progress on the way to 
closer integration with the EU is 
desired“21. 
Ukraine, the country which is 
well ahead of other EaP nations 
in its bilateral relations with EU, 
is particularly concerned over 
the possible perception of EaP 
by some western European 
officials as a substitute for the 
promise of country’s EU mem-
bership. Ukraine regards it as 
yet another phase in the 
process of eventual accession 
to the EU and stresses the fact 
the EaP recognizes Ukraine’s 
European identity. In his 
comments on EaP, the 
President of Ukraine Victor 
Yushchenko welcomed this 
initiative as a «separate formula 
of relations with Eastern Europe 
countries», underlining, how-
ever, that «Ukraine does not 
perceive the dialogue within the 
framework of Eastern Partner-
ship as an alternative to our 
integration expectancies, we are 
developing through the 
Association Agreement….We 
would not like the dialogue of 
integration replaced by other 
form, which does not foresee 
                                               
                                               
21 K. GOGOLASHVILI, The EU and 
Georgia – The Choice is in the 
Context. Europe in Dialogue, 
Bertelsmann Foundation, 2009/1, 
p. 93. 
Ukraine’s membership in the 
EU»22.  
EaP opens up new 
opportunities for Azerbaijan to 
strengthen its relations with the 
EU in the area of energy 
security by offering an 
enhanced engagement with 
Azerbaijan as the only EaP 
hydrocarbon exporting partner 
to the EU, based on 
Azerbaijan’s gradual conver-
gence with the EU energy 
market and infrastructure 
integration23. However chances 
for developing sound demo-
cratic policies in Azerbaijan by 
means of EaP remain low.    
In case of Moldova, the initiative 
was met by a criticism which 
largely relied on the premise 
that EaP serves as a tool for 
diverting Moldova’s from its goal 
of EU membership and does 
not take into account its 
advance status in transfor-
mation process. Surprisingly, 
this statement came against the 
backdrop of the election crisis24.  
However, one would also sug-
gest that Russian factor has to 
be taken into account here as 
well.    
This brief overview of 
approaches of the target 
countries demonstrates that in 
selecting tools for further 
engagement with the eastern 
partners the EU will need to 
draw upon the realistic 
assumptions on the conditions 
and capabilities of each target 
country and develop flexible and 
22 Official website of the President 
of Ukraine www.president.gov.ua. 
23 EC Communication on Eastern 
Partnership. Brussels, December 
3, 2008, http://ec.europa.eu/extern 
al_relations/eastern/index_en.htm. 
24 H. WALLACE, The European 
Union and Its Neighborhood, 
ELIAMEP Thesis, 4/2009, May 
2009, p. 3. 
specifically tailored approaches 
that will respond to the 
requirements of the partner 
countries.   
 
Conclusion 
EaP offers a pool of new 
opportunities for raising the level 
of engagement with the EU’s 
eastern neighbors. It is early to 
assess the prospects of EaP. 
However, there are certain 
points that one could identify: 
• Development of eastern 
dimension of ENP marks a 
significant shift in the EU’s 
perception of its eastern 
neighbors. This provides for a 
more favorable environment 
for the six target countries to 
raise the level of there 
engagement with the EU.  
• Bilateral and multilateral 
components of EaP further 
diversify mechanisms for 
exchange of experiences and 
information on the status of 
the processes of Euro-
peanization in the eastern 
neighborhood. 
• EaP steps up the EU visibility 
in the region that requires 
more resources and attention, 
particularly, from the EU 
member countries, for 
ensuring its stable and secure 
development.    
In order to deliver on the major 
promise of this initiative – a 
deeper level of political and 
economic integration with the 
EU – certain challenges are to 
be addressed: 
• A steady commitment from 
the EU member states should 
be ensured. This implies a 
continuous political support, 
with the active advocacy on 
the part of the architects of 
this EU initiative. This political 
support should be beefed up 
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by an adequate financial 
contribution, which will cer-
tainly go beyond the 
committed 600 mln Euros. 
Against the backdrop of 
existing unease among EU 
members over the enlar-
gement, immigration, and 
overall instability in the 
eastern neighborhood, it will 
be particularly hard to 
accommodate these internal 
concerns.  
• EU rewards in the framework 
of EaP should be linked to the 
performance level of the 
target countries. One of the 
major challenges that lie 
ahead for EaP is to find the 
tools of persuading the East-
ern neighbors to implement 
the indispensable political and 
economic reforms to meet 
respective EU criteria.  
• EaP should be comple-
mentary to the other existing 
or potential mechanisms for 
the EU’s engagement with its 
eastern neighbors. Principles 
of joint ownership and 
differentiation should be 
fostered in elaboration of 
specific actions.   
• EaP should contribute to the 
strengthening of security in 
the EU’s eastern neighbor-
hood. Without bearing in mind 
the security ramifications of 
the policies pursued by 
means of EaP, it will be 
difficult to think of any 
significant political and eco-
nomic modernization in the 
region. One way to ensure 
this indirect effect of EaP is to 
promote tools for effective 
conflict prevention and con-
fidence-building. For sure, 
successful implementation of 
EaP will raise the level of EU 
visibility in the region and this 
may lead to a more active EU 
engagement in the hard 
security matters, namely, 
conflict resolution.   
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It remains to be seen whether 
EaP will be employed in a way 
that defeats argument about its 
offering a “typical EU solution – 
a long-term, technocratic 
instrument for a region full of 
short-term crises”25. As EaP 
stands now, it is rather a 
conceptual framework, for 
streamlining the EU policies 
toward the eastern neighbors 
which in fact does not respond 
to the existing contradictions 
and differences between the 
policies pursued in the target 
countries and requirements of 
the EU integration. The 
character of these different 
approaches varies from country 
to country depending on existing 
internal conditions and govern-
mental preferences. However, 
the EU will inevitably need to 
come up with the tools and 
mechanisms which will translate 
the ideas of EaP into actions. 
This is definitely a two-way 
process which calls for a 
development of a realistic and 
unambiguous agenda on the 
EU side vis-à-vis partners and 
existence of a strong political will 
on the part of the latter.     
 
 
 
25 A. RETTMAN, EU Summit Text 
loaded With Eastern Tension, 
EUObserver.com, May 7, 2009. 
